

SWORN STATEMENT

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
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1. LOCATION Carlisle Barracks	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/17	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME WOJDAKOWSKI, WALTER	6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS MG	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS V Corps, Heidelberg, Germany			

I, Walter Wozdakowski WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH

On 3 September 2002, I became the deputy commander for V Corps. On 15 June when V Corps became CJTF-7, I became the Deputy Commander for LTJG SANCHEZ. The 800th MP Brigade was placed TACON to CJTF-7 on 15 June 2003. By July, the 800th had its entire brigade in Iraq with the exception of the Headquarters and the support base that was in ARIFJAN, Kuwait. At this time, I told BG HILL, the 800th commander, that he could not support his units from ARIFJAN and needed to move to either CAMP VICTORY or ANACONDA in Iraq. From Iraq I felt the commander and HQ's could better supervise the various BDE units firsthand, they could better coordinate with CJTF-7 by being co-located, and we could build the BDE into our great team. I relayed this to BG KARPINSKI (she started command of the 800th in July, and in late August she moved the BDE HQ's to Camp Victory. I did not see BG KARPINSKI and did not give written input to her OER. She was rated by BG DIAMOND, 377th Theater Support Commander. The 800th MP BDE had the responsibility to run all detention facilities in Iraq. Since the Baghdad was TACON to CJTF-7, our degree of oversight was command authority over forces made available for tasking, limited to the detailed and local direction and control of movements necessary to accomplish missions assigned. I kept abreast of all the separate Brigades in CJTF-7 by holding a Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) update three times a week with commanders. I included 800th MP's on that update, but BG KARPINSKI very seldom participated. LTJG Sanchez held a nightly TACSAT update with his MSC commanders, but the separate BDE's were not included. As the deputy commander, I was responsible for overseeing logistical support for all facilities in Iraq, along with many other duties, and therefore dealt with Abu Ghraib extensively in that capacity. I ran an Acquisition Review Board which planned and allocated resources for life support and resource support for all major units and every facility in Iraq. Since Abu Ghraib was a key facility where consolidation of detainee operations was needed, we allocated a lot of resources into the site. BG KARPINSKI always came to me when she needed support, along with all the other BDE Com's. In my attempts to help the 800th MP BDE I referred her to work with the C4 and the rest of the staff to get the resources she needed - we worked through a host of issues with supporting Abu Ghraib and other detainee facilities. COL PAPPAS assumed command of the 205th in July 2003 from COL PARRISH. I was, and am still, COL PAPPAS' chief of staff, a very complex mission with his brigade supporting CJTF-7 throughout Iraq. His unit was conducting intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Long Range Surveillance Detachment (LRS), Interrogation, and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Operations. Interrogation operations were being conducted in several locations when COL PAPPAS took over. He had a good team of battalion commanders. We needed a central facility where we could hold detainees and screen them and Abu Ghraib was the logical place. It was in the central location of the Sunni Triangle and most detainees were coming from that area. The other reason for consolidation was the need for efficient use of scarce resources. We constantly redistributed resources and consolidation at Abu Ghraib helped us focus resources on that facility and that forward operating base. Camp Cropper was closed because it was at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) and we needed to get all units out of BIAP in order for the Airport to open for commercial business. Camp Bucca would still remain operational but some of its resources were pulled up to support Abu Ghraib. Abu Ghraib was also the logical place for the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC). The C-2, direct staff and Military Intelligence BDE, and the legal staff were all working very hard on the process of handling detainees from the moment they were picked up to the time they were released. LTJG SANCHEZ was concerned and had great expectations on interrogation operations and we all participated in improving this part of our intelligence operations. He gave explicit instructions: A. Treat all detainees humanely; B. Expedite the intelligence gathered. Quickly identify who is of value and who is not. He wanted the MSC's to identify which detainees could be of further value for intelligence value; C. Integrate the future of the Iraqi legal system by releasing detainees of no intelligence value to the host legal system. The Rules of Engagement (ROE, not just interrogation ones) were published from the main CP. I do not remember ever issuing a FRAGO on interrogations, but we may have done one and I simply can't remember it - we published over 2000 orders in my time in Iraq. I do remember several FRAGO's to commanders reinforcing the need to treat all detainees and all Iraqis with respect and LAW the Geneva Convention. There was great effort in developing the right rules of engagement. The process was extremely complex, detailed, thorough and painstakingly complete. It included extensive legal reviews, coordination with CENTCOM and our subordinate units, and

10. EXHIBIT	INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" TAKEN AT DATE

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BECA THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

STATEMENT (Continued)
 complete briefings to our Commander. We would distribute changes through Fragmentary Orders. Yes, FRAGOS were classified to protect and control information flow, but they were written for commanders who could extract pertinent information and pass it on to their soldiers. The FRAGOS were not written to be distributed directly to every soldier. Yes, I did know about some prisoners who were getting to Abu Ghraib without the proper tagging and screening being accomplished by our forward units. We had to tolerate some of this because, given a choice, we knew it was better to sort out detainees at our central facility than forward in a hostile area where people were routinely being killed. We knew we had some challenges in the detainee system and that is why we requested assistance from various places through CENTCOM and the Army. We requested more interrogators, interpreters and HUMINT support. The CG I believe expressed this shortage to the Army and I know the C2, BG FAST did also. COL PAPPAS never came to me and told me he couldn't do the job due to his personnel shortages, but we continuously worked on using personnel in the best possible way. BG KARPINSKI did complain to me about personnel shortages, and we redistributed personnel within CJTF-7 to address her concerns. The MPs had to relocate some detainees to CAMP BUCCA, to lessen overcrowding and this was a challenge. We all knew and had various discussions about the risks when hiring civilians and/or contractors in any area of our mission. Subordinate staff officers and commanders provided specifics on the criteria required to hire contractors and for interrogators through the C2 staff. I do not know the exact interviewing requirements placed upon the contractors prior to being interrogated. I am sure our commanders and a primary staff could hire a contractor if he/she was not working out and I believe we could write into the contract supervisory positions for contractors. I did not have direct knowledge of an alleged detainee abuse case concerning an OGA occurring in a detention facility, but I did hear about it from someone in the C-2 and was told an investigation was initiated. Frankly, I was focused on CJTF-7 operations and did not have the intent or the orders to worry about investigations in OGA. On 1 February, a Transfer of Authority was conducted between LTJ METZ and myself.

Q Is there anything else you would like to add to the statement?
 A I can say, without equivocation or hesitation, that no one in the CJTF-7 Command Group, neither myself or LTC Sanchez condoned or encouraged in any way the mistreatment of any detainees. And, we quickly and forcefully investigated any and all suspected violations of any detainees rights we were made aware of.
 End of Statement

AFFIDAVIT

I, Walter Wodakowski, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

Walter Wodakowski
 (Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 17 day of MAY, 2004 at Carlisle, Barrack

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

 ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[Redacted Signature]
 (Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)
 (UCM), ARTICLE 13b
 (Authority To Administer Oaths)