

FD-448 (Rev. 6-2-97)

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# FBI FACSIMILE COVER SHEET

### PRECEDENCE

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

### CLASSIFICATION

- Top Secret
- Secret
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Time Transmitted: 9:45am 11:05  
 Sender's Initials: BSB  
 Number of pages: 13  
 (including cover sheet)

To: DIG  
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Date: 11/8/05

Facsimile Number: [Redacted]

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From: HRT  
 Name of Office

Subject: \_\_\_\_\_  
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# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 03/05/2002

To: CIRG

From: CIRG

Squad: HRT

Approved By: 

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Drafted By: 

Case ID #: IR 244-0


Title: HRT ADMINISTRATIVE;  
AFTER ACTION REPORT;  
QUANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN, DEPLOYMENT;  
12/11/2001 THROUGH 02/11/2002

Synopsis: After Action Report (AAR) for the FBI Deployment to Quandahar, Afghanistan, 12/11/2001 through 02/11/2002, in support of the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) sponsored by the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

### Situation:

Coalition Forces military actions in Afghanistan had lead to the capture of thousands of suspected Taliban and AlQaeda members. These individuals were termed detainees and were being held in detention facilities throughout Afghanistan and in Pakistan. Detainees in these facilities were screened by the Military Intelligence 

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 Quandahar, Afghanistan, was identified as the location for retention of the detainees singled out by this vetting process. Detainees at Quandahar were interrogated by Military Intelligence for force protection issues, future target identification, and potential threats against U.S. interests foreign and domestic. The initial role for the FBI in Afghanistan was to question detainees at Quandahar to further criminal prosecution and develop intelligence to prevent further terrorist attacks.

### Mission:

The initial role for the HRT during the Afghanistan deployment was twofold; first to act as security for the FBI investigative teams and second to assist in the investigative effort of the incoming detainees to the Quandahar detention facility. Perimeter security provided by military units and the

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confinement of investigative efforts to interrogations being conducted at the detention facility eventually dismissed the need for HRT operators for force protection. Collocated at Quandahar airport with the detention facility was the Joint Special Operations Task Force-South (JSOTF-S). In late December 2001, the JSOTF-S was preparing for its attached forces (SEALs, ARSOF, and assorted coalition special forces (SF) units) to conduct Direct Action (DA) and Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) missions. The JSOTF-S commander requested FBI HRT involvement for the SSE missions. The SSE missions encompassed the exploitation of selected priority targets for time sensitive intelligence relating not only to the immediate needs of the battlefield, but also with respect to post or future attacks against U.S. interests worldwide. It was in this latter area where the JSOTF-S envisioned FBI HRT operators could uniquely benefit the mission force packages assigned to targets. A typical mission force package comprised an SF team, two USAF tactical communicators, two FBI HRT personnel, one linguist and a chemical/biological specialist. On 01/05/2001, HRT operators, b6 SAs [redacted] participated in the first SSE. b7C

Details:

On 12/11/2001, a ten member FBI team deployed to the Middle East in support of CENTCOM's campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The team was comprised of two members of the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), SAs [redacted] two New York (NY) case agents, one Washington Field Office (WFO) case agent, four Crisis Response Unit (CRU) personnel, and team leader Unit Chief [redacted]

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The team deployed via military air charter on 12/11/2001 from Baltimore Washington International airport and arrived on 12/13/2001, at an intermediate U.S. staging base in Doha, Qatar. Two CRU members set up a communications base station at the JIATF forward operating base in Doha and remained at that location.

On 12/16/2001, the remaining eight members forward deployed via military C-17 to Jokokobad, Pakistan. Due to daylight flight restrictions into Afghanistan, the team waited approximately 18 hours for a flight to Quandahar. On 12/17/2001, the team continued on a military C-130 to Quandahar, Afghanistan.

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precipitation. Temperatures ranged from 60-65 daytime highs to 10-20 nighttime lows. Cold weather equipment was a necessity.

Upon arrival, personnel at Quandahar were limited to the Marines controlling the perimeter and the Special Operations Task Force-South. Any support infrastructure was non-existent. All food and water was flown in on nightly supply runs. All personnel were rationed to two MREs and two bottles of water a day. The latrines consisted of slit trenches utilizing old tires on two parallel bars as seats. Hygiene was a persistent problem.

As each night passed, additional units arrived to include a contingent of Navy Seabees who quickly constructed functional military burn barrel latrines. After two weeks of infrastructure influx, a well was discovered at the airport which soon was pumped into a makeshift bath house. However, due to the steady increase in base personnel and the lack of sufficient airflow, food rations continued for the duration of the mission.

On 01/04/2002, a replacement team consisting of three SAs from NY, two SAs from WFO, two SAs from HRT, and one UC from the HRT were deployed via the Bureau's G-5, to replace the FBI personnel in Quandahar, Afghanistan. On 01/06/2002, the rotation of personnel was accomplished. However, HRT SAs [REDACTED] were not rotated so they could continue to participate in SSEs, and CRU SSA [REDACTED] was not replaced and remained at Quandahar. The two HRT operators were [REDACTED]

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The NY and WFO SAs were assigned to work with the Army CID SAs present at Quandahar. The U.S. Army was responsible for conducting the Military Tribunals of all detainees not criminally prosecuted by the Justice Department and CID was to be the investigative branch for development of case files. After approximately one week, two of the NY Agents were sent to Bagram, Afghanistan to assist in interrogations being conducted at that location. Task Force Bowie was located at Bagram and headed by General Harrel. Their primary mission was to develop intelligence from interrogation of very high value detainees. The NY Agents with their specific case knowledge were helpful in the interrogation process.

On 01/23/2002, Director Muller with Deputy EAD Tim Caruso visited Quandahar, Afghanistan. Accompanying them were the Legat and Assistant Legat of Islamabad, Pakistan. All were given briefings on the FBI's involvement in the processing and interrogation of detainees as well as, participation in SSEs. After their departure, the decision to cease participation in the SSEs was made. Without a mission to provide security or

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participate in SSEs, and with the 2002 Winter Olympics about to begin, the HRT Operators returned to the U.S. On 02/10/2002, the second team was relieved in place. Two SAs from NY were sent to Bagram and one NY SA and Los Angeles SA were sent to Quandahar.

**Lessons Learned:**

**A: Investigative:**

1. Lack of a clearly defined mission and no clearly defined intent from FBIHQ:

While there was value to a Bureau presence in Afghanistan, it seems that as an organization the FBI did not move beyond simply establishing a presence. The investigative priorities were for the most part decided by those on the ground at Bagram and Quandahar - little input was received from FBIHQ or the field offices. The Bureau should implement a mission of long term substance which includes the proper support if we intend to maintain a presence. The time frame for transport of detainees to Cuba has been extended over a period of months and will thereby prolong our presence in Afghanistan. It is likely the Bureau will have agents in Afghanistan well into late March, or later, until Cuba is prepared to receive the remaining detainees.

The agents on the ground evaluated the relevance of the detainees to AL-QAEDA or the Taliban. This was an incredible task given that there were more than 500 detainees that passed through/into Quandahar in the past 45 days. With obstacles like the criminal/intel wall, which has since been lowered, and the recently restricted access to all military draft IIRs, agents were handicapped from fully evaluating the background of each detainee. Detainees also commonly arrived without any identification and their true identity was difficult to impossible to establish in Quandahar.

**Recommendation:** That a section at FBIHQ UBLU/RFU be dedicated to oversee matters for personnel in Afghanistan and help set priorities. The UBLU/RFU sections would be logical selections as they work closely with New York, are the central conduits for information from Afghanistan, and benefit most from the information gained in Afghanistan. This unit could oversee coordination for military transport, logistic requests to include coordination with CRU, CIRG, HRT, and investigative issues. More than 500 detainees have passed through the Quandahar detention facility and it would have been beneficial to have UBLU coordinate traces and responses on each detainee.

2. Intentions with Detainees:

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Agents in Quandahar were limited in conducting in depth interviews due to limitations with translators, lack of available intelligence, space restrictions (six tents were available for interviewing in Quandahar), and prioritization of interviews to the military. Once key AL-QAEDA members were identified, they were quickly transported to Bagram for further exploitation. This discouraged agents from investing a great deal of time in any one detainee. We saw our role in Quandahar as performing triage - identify key members of AL-QAEDA or the Taliban and recommend them for immediate transport to GTMO for in-depth interviews.

**Recommendation:** New York and FBIHQ need to be more proactive in reviewing the detainee lists and making recommendations for interview and transport.

**Recommendation:** The FBI should TDY language trained agents, support personnel, or contract local nationals. Local nationals are being contracted by other government agencies.

### 3. Inprocessing and Outprocessing of Detainees:

The FBI team that took part in this particular mission, had serious doubts as to why FBI agents became involved in this venture. The entire inprocessing/outprocessing procedure was under the command and control of the Military Police. The FBI and CID assumed the role of taking fingerprints, photographs and a DNA samples of incoming detainees and taking an outprocessing photograph after the detainee has been clean shaven. If necessary, the FBI could conduct this process, with the exception of the incoming photograph, under better conditions once the detainee arrived in Guantanamo. To have a combination of three to four FBI and CID agents spending countless work hours processing detainees, many of which were later repatriated, was a waste of valuable resources, when this could have been accomplished by lower enlisted men of the Military Police.

**Recommendation:** [REDACTED]

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B: Logistical support:

1. Communications:

Personnel:

The Crisis Response Unit (CRU) was deployed on 12/11/01. The initial deployment consisted of two Supervisory Special Agents (SSAs) and two Electronics Technicians (ETs). The problem was that the Director said that only Agents could go to Afghanistan. CRU only has three Agents in the Unit (one Unit Chief and two SSAs). The rest of the unit is comprised of ETs. This made rotation of CRU personnel impossible. Possible solutions would be to staff the unit with more Agent personnel, or to arm and train the ETs.

ACS and GroupWise:

As part of the initial loadout, CRU brought two M-4 terminals, a standard B terminal and two Cliff Packs. The M-4s are high data rate InMarSat terminals, mostly used for data transfer. The Cliff Packs are devices that when attached to an M-4, standard B or ISDN line can provide connectivity to the FBI network, which gives access to ACS and GroupWise. The idea was that one Cliff Pack and M-4 would go to Quandahar and one would stay in Doha. Upon arrival in Doha, CRU was told that they would have to limit the amount of equipment taken to Quandahar to two Zarges boxes.


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Handheld Portable Radios:




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Initially, CRU brought ten MASHR handheld portable radios, along with spare batteries.



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TacSat:



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Iridium:

CRU initially deployed with two Iridium telephones. During the personnel rotation on 1/6/02, one of the Iridiums was taken back. These telephones proved very useful in that they had



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InMarSat:

CRU initially brought an M-4 and a Mini-M InMarSat terminals with them. The M-4 was used with a Teles box to attach to the STU III and then to a viasat card. This gave the







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
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Computers:



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Crypto:



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2. Transportation and notification of travel:

Individuals selected for rotation should be notified well in advance of the date set for relief in place of the in-country personnel. This would allow time for purchasing equipment, qualifying with weapons and obtaining visas and pertinent shots. There should also be time built into preparations where the team leader could meet with individuals arriving from various divisions, and brief them on his intent and the mission requirements. This should not occur as the plane is being loaded or in transit where there are no secure gathering facilities.



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A fund site should be continually maintained with the DOD for use of military airlift into and out of the theater of operations. As has been witnessed in this instance, operational use of the Bureau's G-5 does not always take precedence and alternate means of travel should be established and in place prior to the commitment of personnel to overseas operations where commercial air traffic is not available.

Recommendation #1: Agents being deployed to Afghanistan should be given ample time to prepare the following and not depart the U.S. until the following items are in order:

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

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C. Command and Control

There should be one contact point at FBIHQ for the flow of information to and from the forward element. The use of multiple personnel to maintain contact looses continuity for the forward element. Issues and taskings that had been discussed on earlier shifts or on other days are not necessarily know to a change in personnel. This can lead to confusion, a repeat of assignments and a loss of morale for personnel assigned as the forward element.

In this particular situation, Qandahar, Afghanistan, the use of a conference call was extremely difficult. The location of the command post was in the Airport terminal building. Doors and windows had been blown out during previous fighting. Ambient noise levels were high, especially as flights were being processed.

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

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
I would recommend the use of speaker phone conference calls be limited to those circumstances where absolutely necessary, and that one person be appointed as the point of contact for all messages be passed to and from the forward command post.



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D. Sensitive Site Exploitations:

Case agents assigned full time work on terrorism matters possess the most extensive knowledge of case-specific information. However,



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The current war on terrorism is a mixture of law enforcement efforts and military actions. With its leadership role in pursuing criminal prosecution against terrorism, the FBI needs to be in a position to timely information. The FBI's participation in sensitive site exploitations (SSEs) is one mechanism to assist in this endeavor. To make SSEs a viable





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
option for the FBI, I feel the following areas should have FBI involvement:

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6. If HRT is to continue participation in SSEs then I make the following suggestions to better prepare them for these assignments:

[Redacted]

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a. [Redacted]

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b. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] The SSA would also be responsible for cross training with [Redacted] components and overseeing the establishment of appropriate lines for intelligence communications such as SIPRNET with [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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The SSA would also be responsible for placing an LNO [Redacted] to further enhance intelligence collection and fusion into this cell.

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c. HRT should alter training to increase those skills necessary to address SSEs with TF components. (Specific training objectives TBD but should include greater emphasis on patrolling and the use of varied types of communications equipment.)

d. [Redacted]

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The above does not detract from the HRT's current mission statement, but rather adds to it. A commitment of reoccurring personnel and financial resources should accompany the additional responsibilities.

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