

CaseMap Facts Report

Filter: Linked To Source(s): (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) **Interview 1" - 16 of 7911 (0.2%) Filtered**

Case: FBI in Military Zones

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Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s)
<p>(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)</p> <p>(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)</p> <p>(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)</p> <p>(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)</p> <p>(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)</p> <p>(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)</p>	<p>(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) is now with the (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) For the last seven months, he has been (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Assistant Attorney General in the (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and he has not had counter-terrorism matters as part of his portfolio. 1:00 (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) has been with Department of Justice since (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) He started at USAO- (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) He was with that office until (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) His last position there was (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) In April 2002, he came to DC to be (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Was both (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) At that time, he became full time with the (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) in September 2002, he became (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) He served as (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) In January 2006, he became acting Deputy Assistant AG for 6 months in (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) front office while still serving as (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Section - DOJ. He became a permanent Deputy Attorney General in a career slot in (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Division in July 2006. He is still in that position. When Department of Justice formed the (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) 4:10.</p>	<p>(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)</p> <p>Interview 1 at 1:00 - 4:10.</p>
<p>(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)</p>	<p>The Federal Bureau of Investigation had an intelligence gathering capacity in addition to its law enforcement capacity before 9/11 (i.e. World Trade Center case, Cole bombing in the 1990s). That function needed to be expanded, to be more robust (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says it is not "either or." (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that preserving the criminal option was important in the counter-terrorism sphere. The PATRIOT act and other legislative authorities provided more tools, but the criminal option needed to remain viable. The intelligence information from interviews, FISAs and other sources also needed to be fully exploited and appropriately shared. 7:10. That would help to fully understand the steps that needed to be taken against an organization such as Al-Qaeda. 7:20 (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said the ability to train, reorganize, and share needed to be explored. Part of this process meant</p>	<p>(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)</p> <p>Interview 1 at 5:00 - 12:00</p>

	<p>changing the AG guidelines, including the way informants were handled, the way interrogations were conducted, etc. 8:00. The expansion of JTTFs and the advisory counsels was undertaken. Expansion of relationships with "foreign partners" was also undertaken. 9:30. We sought to bring cases ourselves, encourage foreign partners to bring cases, or bring a case jointly -- an extraordinary change. 9:30. [redacted] viewed the role of Criminal Division was to preserve the criminal option. 10:30. He worked to make sure that the US role in an interview was clear, where the results of the interview would be used in a US court. 11:00. There also needed to be coordination among US government entities. For example, Department of Defense collected pocket litter, and chain of custody needed to be preserved in order to be able to use it in a court. The Padilla case is an example, because he went from Department of Defense custody to Department of Justice custody. 12:00.</p>	
<p>To Be Determined</p>	<p>[redacted] said they wanted to work out a protocol that would define the military's role and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's role when they were working side-by-side. For example, [redacted] showing up in a war zone with evidence tape might be viewed negatively by the military. [redacted]</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 at 12:30 - 15:00</p>
<p>To Be Determined</p>	<p>[redacted] said he is not familiar with Federal Bureau of Investigation concerns in 2002 about a Central Intelligence Agency interrogation of a detainee. 16:30. In 2003 [redacted] said he was working with the Central Intelligence Agency on certain criminal referrals relating to interrogation methods used by the Central Intelligence Agency or its contractors. [redacted] and the Central Intelligence Agency -- Office of the Inspector General were looking at the subject matter being discussed in this interview, but [redacted] did not hear of Federal Bureau of Investigation concerns about Central Intelligence Agency methods of interrogation. 17:50.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 at 15:30 - 17:50</p>
<p>To Be Determined</p>	<p>Re [redacted] [redacted] said "we" were trying to build a criminal case, so that we could bring criminal charges if called up to do so. [redacted] does recall general or specific conversations about the matter in which he was treated or interrogated. 20:00.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 at 18:15 - 20:00</p>
<p>To Be Determined</p>	<p>[redacted] said there have been individuals (i.e. Zarquawi) where people have said, "this person will never see the inside of an Article III court." However, [redacted] said, you never know what is going to happen 5, 10 or 15 years down the road. There would be no statute of limitations</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 at 20:15 - 24:00</p>

	intelligence gatherer because you are also evidence-gathering, but he noted that others would have a different opinion. 34:23. Fueling the intelligence stream is a broader goal. 35:30.	
To Be Determined	Did (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) hear from anyone that the old Federal Bureau of Investigation rules were "obsolete?" The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice, in revising guidelines and making sure information was shared, were respectful of that concern. 36:25. This sort of issue came up in the surveillance context. 37:00.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 35:48 - 37:00
To Be Determined	(b)(5)	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 38:00 - 38:30
To Be Determined	Re: Dec email from (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) to David Nahmias on "Legal Issues re: Guantanamo Bay" (DOJ015609CRM). In that time frame (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) worked with David Nahmias. David Nahmias's focus was national security and counter-terrorism. 41:00 (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he has never seen the document before. 41:30 (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) reviewed the last portion of the McCrary memo (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that he is not aware of any discussion of the issues raised in those paragraphs. 43:00.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 39:00 - 43:00
To Be Determined	RE: AGLetter.wpd (FBI0003924) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he has not seen the document before. After reviewing the end of page 2 and page 3 (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he was not aware of discussions relating to taking (b)(1) from U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to a third country. 46:45. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he spoke with Federal Bureau of Investigation criminal investigators about building a case against (b)(1) 47:00. Strategies relating to Federal Bureau of Investigation investigators and Department of Justice may have occurred. CTC-renditions and Department of Defense was not a part of that. 49:00. During that time frame, David Nahmias met regularly with Department of Defense to talk through military issues. 49:30.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 43:00 - 49:30
To Be Determined	Does (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) know if issues relating to (b)(1) were taken to the Principles committee by the AG or the Deputies committee by Robert S. Mueller, III? (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) is not aware of that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) did not attend National Security Coordination Counsel meetings. He did not attend, though he may have helped prepare documents for such a meeting. He did not attend Deputies meetings. 51:00.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 50:00 - 51:00

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

To Be Determined	(b)(5),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 51:30 - 54:30
To Be Determined	In the summer of 2002, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) did not participate in the review of Office of Legal Counsel memos on issues raised by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It came up later in the context of the referrals from the Central Intelligence Agency and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) work with the Central Intelligence Agency – Office of the Inspector General (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) worked on those referrals. 55:30.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 54:00 - 55:30